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INTRODUCTION

I.

On August 21, 2019, Dorraine S. Pool and Michael J. Brown (the "Heirs") filed their
Respondent's Brief.

The Heirs present various arguments, including arguments that Carol

Brown is raising different issues on appeal from those raised before the lower courts, that the
magistrate court did not rule on any community property issues, that the magistrate court's
characterization of the decedent's income was supported by authority, and that the district court
did not err in awarding attorney's fees.

This Reply Brief is filed pursuant to IAR 35(c) in

response to these arguments.
II.
A.

ARGUMENTS IN REPLY

Carol's case on appeal is consistent with the case she presented to the lower courts.

The Heirs argue that Carol is presenting a different case on appeal from what she
presented to the magistrate court and the district court. The record shows that Carol's case is
entirely consistent with the case she presented to the lower courts. Carol took the position before
the magistrate court from the day she filed her petition that Michael's accounts were either
community property or quasi-community property, and that in either case the community
property presumption should apply. R., pp. 26-30. The Heirs incorrectly state that Carol did not
"claim" the accounts included quasi-community property. The record shows otherwise. Carol's
position was that the funds were either community property or quasi-community property, that
the community property presumption should apply in either case, and that it was not her burden
to prove the funds were community property or quasi-community property, but the Heirs' burden
to prove they were separate property.
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The magistrate court decided that under the elective share statute the burden of proof was
on Carol to prove that the accounts were quasi-community property, thus implicitly rejecting
Carol's argument that the community property presumption applies.

R., pp. 189-90.

The

magistrate court also went further and decided that Michael's accounts were not community
property but were almost entirely separate property, and that Carol had no claim to the accounts.
R., pp. 190-95. The Heirs argue that the magistrate court simply held that Carol had not met
what they assert was her "burden" of proving that the accounts were quasi-community property.
The magistrate court's order speaks for itself. It clearly states that the source of the funds in the
accounts is Michael's retirement income, and that this income is "almost entirely separate
property." R., p. 191. The order does not simply hold that Carol's elective share claim failed
because she did not meet her burden of proof. It decides the issue of the characterization of
Michael's accounts as community or separate property. As stated in Carol's opening brief, the
magistrate court's adverse rulings on community property issues, and the adverse effect these
rulings would have on Carol in pursuing her claim to the accounts and on further proceedings in
the probate action, was a significant factor in her decision to appeal the magistrate court's order.
Carol appealed these rulings to the district court. Before the district court she argued that
the legislature intended for the community property presumption to apply under the elective
share statute, and that the magistrate court had erred in its determinations regarding the
characterization of the accounts as separate property. R., pp. 219-233. The district court rejected
Carol's argument that the community property presumption should apply under the elective share
statute, and simply ignored the community property issues decided by the magistrate court,
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apparently thinking its job was done once it affirmed the magistrate's decision to deny Carol's
elective share claim.
Carol has raised the same issues before this Court: the community property presumption
should apply under the elective share statute, and the magistrate court erred in its determination
that the accounts were separate property. The fact that Carol may have raised additional issues
or made additional arguments before the district court is of no consequence. Nothing requires
Carol to appeal every adverse ruling of a lower court. The significant point is that Carol raised
the same issues before the lower courts that are raised in this appeal.
B.

Carol's first issue on appeal was raised before the lower courts and is not moot.

The Heirs argue that Carol's first issue is raised for the first time on appeal. As already
stated, Carol took the position from the beginning that the accounts were either community
property or quasi-community property, and that either way the community property presumption
applied. Carol's appellate brief to the district court argued that the magistrate court erred by
failing to apply the presumption to the accounts, and that the legislature intended the
presumption to apply under the elective share statute. R., pp. 216-22. Carol has consistently
taken the position that quasi-community property is simply a form of community property, and
that the community property presumption should apply to it.
The Heirs further argue that the district court held that the community property
presumption applies to quasi-community property. The district court's opinion speaks for itself.
That court agreed with the magistrate court that a petitioner under the elective share statute bears
the burden of proving that the subject property is quasi-community property. As pointed out in
Carol's opening brief on appeal, this amounts to a reverse presumption that property is separate

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3

property until proven to be quasi-community property. The petitioner must prove the source of
the property to meet this burden, and in most cases will be unable to do so.
Finally, the Heirs rather bizarrely argue that this issue is moot because the magistrate
court already decided that the community property presumption was rebutted. A case is moot
when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome." Goodson v. Nez Perce County Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993
P.2d 614, 616 (2000). The portion of the magistrate court's opinion that decided the community
property presumption had been rebutted and the accounts were separate property is source of the
issues raised on appeal that the district court chose to ignore. In relying on the magistrate court's
holding that the community property presumption was rebutted, the Heirs contradict their own
argument that Carol is not prejudiced by the magistrate's decision. The district court's implied
affirmation by inaction of the magistrate's decision is on appeal before this Court. An active
controversy exists regarding these issues, and the magistrate's decision does not render the issues
in this appeal "moot."
C.

Community property issues were raised before the magistrate court, the magistrate
court considered and decided these issues in its opinion, and its rulings were adverse
to Carol's interests.

The Heirs argue that the magistrate court could not have ruled on community property
issues because they were not raised by Carol's claim. The record clearly shows that community
property issues were raised in Carol's petitions to the magistrate court and were briefed and
argued repeatedly before the magistrate court by both parties because the parties saw them as
relevant to Carol's claim. R., pp. 85-88; 100-01; 107-09; 115-20; 150-58; 160-61; 163-74. Due
to the lack of evidence regarding the source of most of the funds in Michael's accounts, Carol
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based her claim to the accounts on the community property presumption and argued that the
Heirs had the burden to prove that the accounts were separate property. The Heirs attempted
through evidence and argument to persuade the magistrate court that the accounts were separate
property. While the Heirs now assert that Carol did not raise these issues and the magistrate
court did not decide any community property issues, the magistrate court's order speaks for itself.
That court considered and accepted the Heirs' arguments regarding the source of the funds in the
accounts, the characterization of Michael's retirement income, and the availability of an offset to
the Heirs for any community property that might be in the accounts.

1

The court concluded that

the accounts were almost entirely separate prope1iy, and that Carol had no claim to any funds of
the accounts. R., pp. 190-95. Issues are appealable if they are raised before a lower court or if
there is an adverse ruling from a lower court. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d
317, 323 (2003). Issues concerning the characterization of the accounts were raised before the
magistrate court, and the court's conclusions were adverse to Carol. Carol had the right to
appeal the magistrate court's conclusions.
The Heirs also argue that Carol is not prejudiced by the magistrate court's consideration
of her community property claims. If Carol had the opportunity to litigate these issues before the
magistrate court, the issues were litigated, and the magistrate court reached a conclusion on the
merits, Carol is bound by the court's conclusions in both the probate action and in any separate

1

The Heirs argue that the magistrate court applied the offset only in the context of calculating her possible elective
share claim. However, the magistrate court's erroneous finding that Carol received "gifts" of separate property from
Michael during the marriage could also have an adverse impact on Carol's ability to make a community property
claim to the accounts and on the settlement of the estate in subsequent probate proceedings.
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action. The record shows that these issues were litigated before the magistrate court, and that the
court reached conclusions on the merits of Carol's community property claims in its order.2
Finally, the Heirs argue that a decision of a probate court regarding the characterization
of property as separate or community is not appealable, citing Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845,
555 P.2d 385 (1976). The Heirs seem to suggest that once a probate court has decided whether a
decedent's property is community or separate this decision cannot be challenged on appeal.
Appellate courts have many times in the past considered probate courts' decisions on the
characterization of a decedent's property. See, e.g., Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,
443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ct. App. 1994) (reversing finding that decedent's assets were separate
property); Matter of Eliasen's Estate, 105 Idaho 234, 237-40, 668 P.2d 110, 113-16 (1983).
What the Court actually held in Estate of Freeburn was that an interlocutory decision of a
probate court regarding whether property is community or separate is not an appealable order.
The Freeburn Court went on to conclude that the interlocutory decision regarding the
characterization of property could be reviewed on appeal of a final order because upon appeal
"the court may review the verdict or decision and any intermediate order or decision, if excepted
to, which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment, except a decision or order from
3
which an appeal might have been taken." Id. at 848,388 (emphasis in original). Here, the order

appealed from was the magistrate court's order denying Carol's elective share claim. This is an
appealable order under I.C. 17-201. The magistrate court's decisions regarding the
characterization of Michael's property were contained within this appealable order.
2

Unsurprisingly, the Heirs have taken a very different position in probate proceedings before the magistrate court,
in which they have freely cited the magistrate court's order as having decided community property issues.
3
This is why Carol had no choice but to appeal the magistrate court's order or be bound by its determinations of the
separate or community character of Michael's property. The failure to appeal an appealable order would make the
magistrate court's decisions unreviewable.
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D.

Carol did not ask the district court to reweigh evidence.

The Heirs argue that Carol merely asked the district court to reweigh the evidence and
that the district court did not err in declining to do so. The Heirs are mistaken. Carol did not ask
the district court to reweigh evidence; she argued that the magistrate court's factual conclusions
were not based on substantial evidence and contradicted the evidence in the record. This is
entirely different from weighing evidence. Weighing evidence means deciding which piece of
contradictory evidence is more credible, a task that is for the trier of fact. DeBaca v. McAffee,
109 Idaho 800, 802, 711 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Ct. App. 1985). Here, there is little or no dispute
about the evidence. The magistrate court simply ignored evidence that contradicted its finding
that the source of the funds in the accounts must be Michael's retirement income. Moreover, the
magistrate court applied the wrong legal standard in making its finding.

The community

property presumption can only be rebutted by evidence showing with reasonable certainty and
particularity that property derives from a separate source. Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 798, 430
P.2d 685, 689 (1967). The magistrate court essentially concluded that because Carol did not
know of any source other than Michael's retirement income, and there was no evidence of
another source, the source must have been Michael's retirement income. This lacks any certainty
or particularity, and it puts the burden on Carol to prove an alternative source to resolve the
uncertainty.

This is inconsistent with the case law holding that the community property

presumption must be rebutted with evidence showing with reasonable certainty and particularity
that property derived from a separate source.
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E.

The magistrate court did not cite relevant authority to support its characterization
of Michael's retirement income.

The Heirs assert that Carol falsely claimed that the magistrate court relied on no authority
when it concluded that Michael's retirement income was separate property. They quote from
Carol's appellate brief, then proceed to misrepresent what the brief actually says. Carol argued
that the magistrate court cited no relevant authority in support of its characterization of Michael's
retirement income, while acknowledging that although the magistrate court cites no case in its
opinion "it is clear from the proceedings that the magistrate court based its decision on the 'time
rule' set forth in Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975)." Thus, Carol's brief
already informed the Court of the authority the magistrate relied on, the information the Heirs
assert was withheld. As discussed at length in Carol's appeal to the district court, this case was
not relevant authority because it considers the division of a retirement account in a divorce, not
the characterization of retirement income received during marriage.
F.

Carol's argument regarding attorney's fees is consistent with the argument
presented to the district court.

The Heirs assert that Carol's argument that the district court erred in awarding attorney's
fees does not reflect what Carol argued on appeal to the district court. The record does not
support this assertion. In her brief to this Court, Carol argues that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees because the case involved matters of first impression and
because the district court ignored relevant issues raised on appeal that were supported by
argument and authority. Carol argued to the district court that the magistrate court should have
applied the community property presumption in deciding her elective share claim because the
legislature intended the presumption to apply to claims under the elective share statute. R., pp.
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219-20. This is the matter of first impression referenced in the argument regarding attorney's
fees. Carol also argued to the district comi that it should not award attorney's fees because the
case involved issues for which there was no existing authority. R., p. 281. Much of Carol's
argument to the district court focused on the community property issues decided by the
magistrate court, and the reasons that the magistrate court's rulings were in error. R., pp. 222233. As already discussed herein, these decisions were contained within the court's order, were
adverse to Carol, and were appealable. These are the issues the district court ignored in its
opinion on appeal.
G.

This Court should not award attorney fees on appeal.

The Heirs argue that Carol's appeal to this Court, like her appeal to the district court, is
frivolous, and that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. As set forth in the opening brief on
appeal, the district court erred in finding that Carol's appeal was frivolous because she presented
reasonable arguments on matters of first impression and because the district court ignored
legitimate issues properly raised on appeal that were supported by relevant argument and
authority. The Heirs argue that Carol should have followed the district court's "instructions"
regarding how to properly pursue her community property claim instead of filing this appeal. As
previously stated in her opening brief to this Court, Carol could not follow the district court's
suggestion to pursue her claim in a separate action because the magistrate court had already
decided the relevant community property issues, the district court had ignored these issues on
appeal, and she would be bound by the magistrate's decision. While the Heirs argue that Carol
should not have pursued this appeal, if she had followed the district court's instructions and filed
a separate action, they would surely have argued that Carol was bound by the magistrate court's
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decisions regarding community property issues, as they have done in subsequent proceedings in
the probate action. They cannot have it both ways. If Carol is bound by the magistrate court's
decisions on community property issues those issues are appealable, and an appeal that includes
issues supported by argument and relevant authority is not frivolous. Carol's appeal is not
frivolous, and an award of attorney's fees to the Heirs is not appropriate.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision on appeal should be reversed.

11
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this It day of September, 2019.

WHITE PETERSON

~
)_
_ _ _ _ __
__
_ _(
By: _~
Brian T. O'Bannon
Attorneys for Personal Representative/
Appellant Carol McCoy Brown

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 12 th day of September, 2019, I filed the foregoing Appellant's
Reply Brief electronically through the iCourt system, which caused the following parties or
counsel to be served by electronic means, as set forth below:

Attorneys for Respondents Michael J Brown & Dorraine S. Pool:
Kara M. Gleckler
CANYON RIVER LAW, LLP

Email:
kara@canyonriverlaw.com

Kirk A. Melton
RANDSLA W, PLLC

Email:
kmelton@randslawidaho.com

I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered iCourt users
and have not electronically appeared and require paper/mail service and that on 12TH day of
September, 2019, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served upon
the following by method indicated below:
Carol McCoy Brown
P.O. Box 1412
McCall, Idaho 83638

IE! U.S. Mail

Joshua 0. Pool
990 Arrow Wood
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301

IE! U.S. Mail

Jacob F. Pool
c/o Dorraine S. Pool
765 Lawrence
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301

IE! U.S. Mail

Christopher R. Brown
102 W. Midway St.
Filer, Idaho 83328

IE! U.S. Mail

Michael B. Brown
P.O. Box 196
Fairfield, Idaho 83321

IE! U.S. Mail

for WHITE PETERSON
W: \Work\B\Brown, Carol McCoy 24986\Appeal SCT. 003\Appellant Reply Briej\Rep/y Brief 09-12-19 th.doc

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11

